





cademic research aimed at understanding the consumer default de-
cision has grown rapidly over the past decade. The genesis of this
research is the product of three broad sets of forces. First, advances
in pure theory gave economists a better understanding of the implications of
allowing default for consumer welfare and credit market outcomes. Second,
the relatively striking growth of unsecured consumer debt and default in the
1990s spurred the interests of applied researchers in explaining the default
decision.1 Third, and most recently, advances in computational technology
have allowed economists to map the insights from pure theory into models
capable of confronting observed data and yielding quantitative implications.
Thisarticledocumentstheevolutionofrecentworkonpersonalbankruptcy.
Thequestionsaddressedbythisresearchrangefromtheroleofincomeuncer-
tainty in driving ﬁnancial distress to the roles of statutes allowing households
to shelter wealth and of decreased moral commitment to repay debts.
Theextantliteratureconsistsofavarietyofeconomicapproachestopolicy
analysis. For example, several recent papers employ detailed analyses of ob-
served data. Some of these analyses—notably Gropp, Scholz, and White
(1997); Elul and Subramanian (2002); and Grant (2003)—cleverly exploit the
near-natural experiments provided by interstate variation in bankruptcy law.
At the other end of the spectrum are the so-called “equilibrium” approaches,
typiﬁed in the work of Athreya (2002, 2004, forthcoming), Chatterjee, Cor-
bae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2002); Li and Sarte (forthcoming); Livshits,
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1 Throughout this article, the words “bankruptcy” and “default” are used interchangeably.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 91/2 Spring 2005 7374 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
MacGee, and Tertilt (2003); and others. These approaches have in common
settings in which households optimize, and in which equilibrium conditions
such as those implied by competition, market clearing, and resource feasi-
bility are imposed. Such researchers explicitly solve household optimization
problems parameterized through “calibration” or estimation, and then employ
simulation to understand bankruptcy policy. What follows documents most
directly the contributions of these “equilibrium” models.
The article is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the intuition
captured in purely theoretical models of default. Section 2 documents some
of the empirics pertaining to personal bankruptcy. Section 3 discusses a set
of quantitative equilibrium models based on the theoretical foundations dis-
cussed in the ﬁrst section. Each of these models analyzes the role of default
at both the individual and aggregate levels in a manner that respects salient
features of U.S. data. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1. BASIC THEORY
The Role of Limited Insurance
Proponents of current bankruptcy law have long argued for the role of debt
forgiveness in helping those hit by unexpected hard times. The “honest but
unfortunate debtor” is now folkloric. Central to this view is a belief that life is
characterizedbyanontrivialamountofuninsurablerisk. Inparticular,instead
ofpoolingrisksthroughexplicitinsurancecontracts,householdsmaydosome
risk-management by saving in good times and borrowing in bad times. The
spectreofpersistentmisfortune,asitmayleavehouseholdsinﬁnancialstraits,
raisesthepossibilitythatoccasionallyallowingdefaultmaybeuseful. Inother
words, the default option may act like an insurance policy against very bad
luck.
Formalizing the insurance role of the option to default is the subject of
several recent works. The seminal references are the papers of Dubey, Gean-
akoplos, and Shubik (2005) and Zame (1993), who both study outcomes in
stylized two-period models in which all uncertainty resolves at the terminal
date. The critical assumption made in their work is that insurance markets
against second-period risk are incomplete. Of course, without this imper-
fection, allowing default simply corrodes the ability of borrowers to commit
to repaying debts, and can therefore only make matters worse. The key result
oftheirworkisthatinsuchaworld, allowingdefaultsubjecttoaﬁnitepenalty
can improve allocations, even if it means that default occurs in equilibrium.
The intuition is that default, by allowing repayment to partially suit the im-
mediate needs of a household, can provide a “state-contingency” to debt that
aids smoothing. The following elegant example from Zame (1993) makes the
point more clearly.K.Athreya: Personal Bankruptcy:A Survey 75
Example 1: Default Can Be Especially Useful
The analysis in Zame (1993) contains two central insights. The ﬁrst insight
is that allowing default can very nearly create a fully insured income stream
in situations where completely insuring against risk may require promising to
occasionally pay very large amounts to a counterparty. The second insight is
that if the underlying structure of assets is such that their payoffs are “similar”
to each other, then households will necessarily be forced to promise very
large payments to counterparties in some states in order to obtain insurance
against other states. In such a setting, the addition of more assets with similar
structure will not help. That is, default is uniquely useful in overcoming
insurance-market incompleteness.
Consider a world with two agents with identical, risk-averse, standard,
expectedutilityfunctions,andtwodates,1and2. Ontheﬁrstdate,bothagents
are endowed with a unit of the good. On the second date, each agent draws
stochasticincomeintheformofasingleconsumptiongoodthatdependsonan
aggregate state that takes values from a countably inﬁnite set,   ={ 1,2,...}.
The endowment of Agent 1, (where the ﬁrst entry is the date-1 endowment),
is denoted e1. The endowment of each agent depends on the aggregate state
as follows: e1 ={ 1;1,7,1,1,1,...}. Similarly, Agent 2 faces endowment
e2 ={ 1;7,1,1,1,1,...}. Next, we impose a probability distribution, µ(ω),
over income levels, ω ={ 1,2,...}. Speciﬁcally, let µ(1) = µ(2) = 1/4, and
µ(ω) = 3−ω+2 for ω>2. This probability distribution has the property that
the probability of receiving income from a state with a relatively high index,
ω, is far lower than the probability of receiving income from a state with a
relatively low index.
A complete-markets Walrasian equilibrium for this economy is Pareto
efﬁcient, whereby there is perfect risk sharing between the two agents. There-
fore, given the symmetry in preferences and endowments, the equilibrium
allocationisoneinwhichconsumptionforeachagent, ci, i = 1,2, isanequal
shareofaggregateincome. Undertheassumedaggregateendowmentprocess,
equilibrium consumption is therefore given by ci ={ 1;4,4,1,1,1,...}, for
i = 1,2. Notice that this means that individual-level consumption varies only
withtheaggregateendowmentoftheeconomy,andnotwithanyagent-speciﬁc
changes in endowments.
To achieve this allocation, Agent 1 gives up three units of date-2, state-2
consumption, in return for three units of date-2, state-1 consumption, with
Agent 2 taking the other side of the transaction. Lastly, consider the following
ﬁnite set of assets, A1,A2,...AK, that will allow some, but not complete, in-
surance. Leteachrowinthematrixbelowdescribethestate-contingentdate-2
payoffsforagivenasset. Thefollowingassetstructuredoesnotpermitperfect
smoothing.76 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
A1 = 12000... .
A2 = 012000 .. .
A3 = 001200 .. .
. 000120 0 ..
. ...... . ..
. ...... . ..
AK = ....... 1(kth position) 2 .
(1)
In this case, notice that to replicate the payoffs of the Pareto efﬁcient out-
come in the ﬁrst four states, for example,Agent 1 needs to hold the following
portfolio:
F4 = 3A1 − 9A2 + 18A3 − 36A4.
While this allocation replicates the Pareto optimum, by construction, for
states 1−4, the liability thatAgent 1 incurs in state 5 is -72 units of consump-
tion. This liability far exceeds Agent 1’s endowment in state 4 (which is 1).
If default were disallowed, then the given asset structure could not replicate
the optimal allocation for even the ﬁrst four states. Moreover, the essence of
Zame’s example is that the addition of more assets with the payoff structure
here beyond A1...AK will not help, so long as we continue to require that
all liabilities be satisﬁed with certainty. As seen, with securities A1...A2N,
to achieve the optimal risk sharing for states 1 − 2N, Agent 1 would owe
-9(22N−1) in state 2N +1. Given the endowment structure, this is again infea-
sible. However, if debt forgiveness is allowed, with a ﬁnite penalty, λ—that
is, assumed proportional to the liability—matters change. For default in state
2N, the expected penalty is 9λ(2
3)2N−1. Therefore, the possibility exists for λ
small enough that Agent 1 will be willing to hold portfolio F2N, while Agent
2 ﬁnds this acceptable. The key, to repeat, is that default can void the need
for households to hold very large liabilities, and can also facilitate trades that
additional assets, however many, may not be able to achieve.
The Role of Limited Commitment
The opponents of the above arguments argue that any beneﬁts that potentially
arise from default are confronted by even larger costs. Perhaps most com-
monly, opponentsofdefaultandbankruptcyhavearguedthatdebtforgiveness
and other forms of limited liability may simply encourage proﬂigacy, sloth,
and impose costs on other, more judicious borrowers.2 Moreover, lenders and
insurers themselves may be wary of entering into contracts with households
2Arguments against bankruptcy tend to center around the spill-overs that may accompany
default. For example, the argument that easy default reduces thrift is only germane if it changes
the opportunities that others may have. Similarly, if easy bankruptcy encourages shirking at theK.Athreya: Personal Bankruptcy:A Survey 77
endowed with the right to “walk away.” In other words, an important possi-
bility is that it is misleading to take incompleteness as a given when studying
bankruptcy, precisely because incompleteness may be caused by the option
to default in the ﬁrst place. The crux of this argument is twofold. First, the
willingness of households to commit to repayment is driven by, among other
things, the extent to which they can self-insure. If bankruptcy offers good
self-insurance, then participation and the demand for formal insurance may
bediminished. Thatis,privatecreditwithdefaultmaybecrowdingoutformal
insurance, leading observers to wrongly conclude that markets for risk remain
highly incomplete. This strand of the literature, typiﬁed by the theoretical
work of Kocherlakota (1996), begins by allowing a full set of insurance con-
tracts to be traded, and then studies the extent to which limited commitment
for repayment “shrinks” the feasible set of contracts. In this manner, these
models produce incomplete insurance as an outcome, as opposed to merely
asserting it to begin with. In these settings, because insurance markets are
rich enough to allow full risk sharing under unlimited liability, the welfare
consequences of introducing consumer bankruptcy are unambiguously neg-
ative. The following simpliﬁed example illustrates the manner in which the
possibility of default limits insurance provision.
Example 2: Default Can Cause Incomplete Insurance
Consider a risk-averse consumer who faces income risks. Assume that the
consumer can contract with a perfectly diversiﬁed insurance company who
is committed to honoring all contracts. Denote a ﬁnite set of income real-
izations by y ∈{ y1,y 2,...yN}, where yi <y j if i<j . Denote the relative
likelihoods of various income realizations by a probability distribution π1,
π2,...πN, whereby
N
i=1 πi = 1. Let household utility be given by u(C(yi)),
where C(yi) denotes consumption in state-i. Let mean income be normalized
to one, and let P(y i) denote the transfers made by the consumer to the insur-
ance company. Negative values are interpreted as transfers to the consumer,
while positive values represent payments by the consumer.





C(yi) = yi − P(y i).
workplace, or reduces search effort when unemployed, this too is relevant for social well-being
only to the extent that such behavior places a burden on an unwitting employer or unemployment
insurance scheme. The ability of bankruptcy to impose such costs depends fundamentally on what
aspects of individual behavior may be observed—and, hence, priced—in competitive markets. For
example, if shirking on the job and search effort among the unemployed were costly to observe,
the distortion to behavior created by a default option might be socially quite harmful. I will return
later to the role of observability in altering the desirability of allowing bankruptcy protection.78 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The solution to this problem is perfect insurance. Namely, the consumer
will be left, net of insurance premiums, with a perfectly smooth proﬁle of
consumption equal to the mean income of unity, regardless of the income
realization. To achieve this proﬁle, the consumer will pay a premium equal to
the excess of current income over mean income: yi − 1, whenever income is
larger than the mean, while receiving the difference between realized income
and mean income whenever the former is smaller.
The limited commitment is now introduced as follows. Assume that the
consumer cannot credibly commit to repay any more than a fraction, ψ<1.
Intuitively, it may help to think of a consumer who can leave town if asked to
pay more, and, further, that the consumer has no way of credibly promising
to the insurance company that he will remain in the contract. To facilitate






C(yi) = yi − P(y i).
However, an insurance contract must now satisfy:
P(y i) ≤ ψyi,
whichrepresentslimitedcommitmentorliability. Whilethesolutionisslightly
cumbersome and, therefore, not presented here, the intuition for the solution
of this problem is straightforward.3 If the insurance company wishes to break
even,itmustnotcontractwiththeconsumerinawaythatleavesitvulnerableto
default. In other words, it must not rely on large payments from the consumer
in good states to offset payments it makes to consumer in bad states. Instead,
it must limit payments in bad states in a way that allows it to break even,
given that it will not be able to collect in good states. In other words, limited
commitment can lead to incomplete insurance.
Despite the possibility that limited commitment may create market in-
completeness, a caveat is in order. One must be careful to distinguish the
repudiation of a true “insurance” contract, whereby payments are negatively
correlated with one’s income, from repudiation of a “debt” contract, whereby
payments are uncorrelated (up to bankruptcy) with one’s income. Notably,
default in the former occurs when income is high, while default in the latter
occurs when income is low. Moreover, even if it is limited commitment that
is responsible for incomplete insurance, it may still be useful to have default
as an option. In particular, if there was incompleteness of insurance contracts,
3 The interested reader is referred to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 6) for the detailed
solution to this problem and to Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, Chapter 15) for the more general
dynamic limited commitment problem modeled on Kocherlakota (1996).K.Athreya: Personal Bankruptcy:A Survey 79
regardless of whether incompleteness arose from limited commitment, the
incentive for households to trade contracts to share risk (e.g., through assets
such as those speciﬁed in Zame’s example) would remain.
Default and Moral Hazard
In the previous example, information was assumed to be perfect, and the in-
completeness of insurance emerged solely from the inability of the insured
to commit to the full-insurance contract. If enough information is available
to limit opportunistic behavior by insured households, bankruptcy will be
essentiallyunnecessary. Moreover, insuchasetting, anydistortionstoalloca-
tions caused by bankruptcy will be limited to the level of borrowing that may
take place, since the interest rate on loans will need to reﬂect default risk. If
creditors have few ways of punishing defaulters, as appears to be the empiri-
cally relevant case, one might expect default risk to be high in such a world.
In particular, exclusion from borrowing, the primary long-run consequence
of bankruptcy, may not be an effective deterrent to default when insurance
markets are complete. However, purely intertemporal smoothing, such as that
undertaken by the young to ﬁnance education, will still be greatly hindered
if borrowing is very expensive. Such a potentially important distortion may
persist even with relatively rich insurance markets.
By contrast, if information about the actions taken by insured households
is not easily available, then bankruptcy may impose costs that are rather large.
In the context of unemployment insurance schemes for example, bankruptcy
may greatly exacerbate the incentives to shirk and even take on additional
risks. That is, by enhancing the ability to self-insure, the provision of explicit
insurance may become undesirable. This is an instance of the more general
problem of “moral hazard,” whereby an insured party’s incentives to take
risks in a manner unobservable to the insurer are enhanced. In recent work,
Athreya and Simpson (forthcoming) argue that as a quantitative matter, the
ability of the U.S. public unemployment insurance system to improve welfare
is seriously limited by the availability of bankruptcy.
In sum, the principal insights of the theoretical work presented above are
as follows:
• Default may enhance the functioning of asset markets in helping con-
sumers hedge risks.
• Limited insurance, though it may justify allowing the option to default,
may itself arise from limited commitment.
• The availability of default can be expected to increase moral hazard.80 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2. SOME FACTS
Beginninginthelate1980sandearly1990s,eventsinunsecuredcreditmarkets
attracted the attention of economists. It was a period characterized by three
features: increased credit availability, increased indebtedness, and rapidly in-
creasing personal bankruptcy rates. Striking facts such as these begged expla-
nation, and prompted several analyses. With respect to the trends mentioned
above, the interested reader is referred to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook
(1989, 2000). This article, however, will focus less on accounting for these
factsandmoreondocumentingaspectsofbankruptcythathaveremainedmore
stable over time. In particular, the scrutiny triggered by the growth of credit
anddefault-relatedvariablesledtothediscoveryofavarietyofotherfactsthat
seem to be relatively time-invariant. It is these more “long-run” phenomena
that are the subject of several recent papers discussed below.
The Facts: Bankrupts “R” Us, but Not Quite
Are bankruptcy ﬁlers educated or uneducated? Are they rich or poor, young
or old, sick or healthy, employed or unemployed, entrepreneurs or workers?
The extant body of work has taught us much about “who” bankruptcy ﬁlers
are. The starting point in research on the demographics of bankruptcy ﬁlers
is the seminal work of Sullivan et al.(1989, 2000). The 1989 study surveyed
bankruptcy ﬁlers in the 1980s, while the second captured data through 1997.
With respect to educational attainment, the distributions of attainment are
strikingly similar, (Sullivan et al.2000, 53) with bankruptcy ﬁlers even more
likely than the general population to report having attained “some college.”
However, this is potentially misleading in that bankruptcy ﬁlers are somewhat
less likely than the rest of the population to hold either a college or advanced
degree.
More interesting differences appear when comparing the earnings of ﬁl-
ers and non-ﬁlers for a given level of educational attainment. In Sullivan et
al.(2000), the earnings of college-educated non-ﬁlers to ﬁlers is 1.4, and is
most extreme for those with advanced degrees, where the ratio is roughly 2.
This fact suggests that bankruptcy ﬁlers are disproportionately the recipients
of degrees which offer lower returns. Foreseeable aspects of human capital
acquisition may be the cause of this situation as well as the possibility that
bankruptcyﬁlersareoftenthoseforwhomtheuncertainnatureofpost-college
earningshavebeenresolvedinfavorofpoorearnings. Lastly,intheyearthata
ﬁling occurs, incomes among ﬁlers are substantially lower than for non-ﬁlers.
For example, a sample of ﬁve U.S. states shows that the median income for
ﬁlers is often only half that of non-ﬁlers, while the mean is even more skewed
in favor of non-ﬁlers. Moreover, recent work of Sullivan et al.(2000) and
Bermant and Flynn(2002) suggests that the unemployment rate among ﬁlers
is between three and four times as high as is for the rest of the population,K.Athreya: Personal Bankruptcy:A Survey 81
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giving ﬁllip to the narrative that places shocks to earnings front and center in
explaining personal bankruptcy.
Net indebtedness is much higher for the population of ﬁlers than for the
rest. The only reason that indebtedness is not an obvious feature of the data is
that the median asset exemption as of 1998, measured by Grant (2003), was
$44,000. In other words, households could hold large stocks of wealth while
holding unsecured debts that were dischargeable in bankruptcy. Nonetheless,
few households in bankruptcy hold large stocks of wealth. Median net worth
among ﬁlers was -$10,500 in 1991, while it was $36,000 for the U.S. popu-
lation as a whole. However, the income levels reported above suggest that it
may simply be the mismatch between income and debts, rather than the size
of debts, that matters for bankruptcy. Figure 1 is suggestive of the role of debt
relative to income in accounting for recent trends in bankruptcy.
With respect to age, bankruptcy ﬁlers are also similar in age to the general
population. Sullivan et al.(2000) ﬁnd in their sample that, as of 1997, the
median age of ﬁlers was only slightly lower than the national median of 41.7
years. However, the median hides the feature that roughly 85 percent of ﬁlers
are younger than 55.A ﬁnal dimension along which bankruptcy ﬁlers may be82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
distinguished is by their prior employment experience. Speciﬁcally, entre-
preneurship is featured prominently in the histories of bankruptcy ﬁlers. Sul-
livan et al.(1989) document that fully 20 percent of ﬁlers in their data from
the 1980s report themselves to be self-employed in a business venture, even
though entrepreneurs account for only slightly more than 10 percent of the
U.S. population. In sum:
Bankruptcy ﬁlers are similar to the overall U.S. population along the dimen-
sions of education and median age, but differ from the overall U.S. population
inthataretheymorelikelytobeyoung, lownet-wealth, sick, unemployed, and
self-employed.
3. QUANTITATIVE THEORY: RUNNINGA HORSE RACE
More recently, the theoretical contributions of Dubey et al.(2005), Zame
(1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and others have been critical in motivating
dynamic general equilibrium models aimed at evaluating the consequences
of bankruptcy. The distinguishing features of these models are much greater
attention to institutional richness pertaining to personal bankruptcy statutes
and a reliance on numerical solutions. Notably, the households in these set-
tings can be distinguished clearly by age, debt portfolios, insurance policies,
and other ways observable in the data. The payoff to the introduction of these
complications is to allow for quantitative evaluations of the relative strengths
of the forces of incomplete insurance and limited commitment.
To provide intuition as to how the particular quantitative aspects of in-
complete insurance operate, consider the following: As a quantitative matter,
the relevance of Dubey et al.’s (2005) justiﬁcation depends on the precise
difﬁculties imposed by incomplete insurance markets that, in turn, depend
crucially on the nature of income risk faced by households. Labor income
is important as it accounts for most household income and is typically not
directly insurable (perhaps for the obvious complications created by moral
hazard). For example, consider an environment in which households that face
risk to income may borrow and save, but have no option to default. That is, all
debtshavetobehonored, regardlessofthecircumstancesfacingtheborrower.
Suppose also that the household was susceptible to both short-term and very
long-lasting shocks. Relative to a short-term shock, receiving a long-term
shock can much more seriously alter the present value of future income. If
such a shock were negative, the present value of future income could fall sub-
stantially, making the acquisition of debts to smooth consumption in the face
of short-term shocks potentially very expensive.
A key implication of standard models of consumption and savings is that
householdsborrow(or“dissave”)progressivelylessasshocksgrowmoreper-
sistent. Inotherwords,thewillingnessofhouseholdstoeffectivelyself-insureK.Athreya: Personal Bankruptcy:A Survey 83
temporary income disturbances might reasonably depend on their likelihood
of receiving more persistent shocks. This is one sense in which the possibility
of default can “grease the wheels” of credit markets. This line of reasoning is
addressed more fully inAthreya and Simpson (forthcoming).
Therelativestrengthoftheeffectsoftheforceslistedaboveareultimately
key to deciding on the possibility of a beneﬁcial role for bankruptcy. While
thereisagooddealofempiricalworkdescribingthesalientfacts, questionsof
welfare are not addressed in that literature. The interested reader is referred to
the thorough review of empirical work contained in the Congressional Bud-
get Ofﬁce (2000). I focus instead on a handful of representative quantitative
models,allofwhichcontainforward-lookinghouseholdsthatfaceuninsurable
risks. An advantage of this approach is that welfare can be easily evaluated
for equilibriums allocations. The ﬁrst group of environments contain a single
asset, attached to which is a bankruptcy option. These models are essentially
direct extensions of the work of Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993). How-
ever, the payoffs from the single asset do not vary for any other reason, which
precludesanalysisofaggregateriskandalsoconstrainsinsurancepossibilities
in a particularly strong manner. The second class of models allows for more
than one asset, as well as for richer insurance possibilities beyond noncontin-
gent unsecured consumer debt. For convenience, Table 1 presents a stylized
taxonomy of the models discussed below.
Single-Asset Models
Chronologically, the ﬁrst quantitative evaluation of bankruptcy appears to be
Zha (2001). The key features of this environment are (1) a large number
of risk-averse households and (2) the presence of uninsurable, but purely
idiosyncratic, risk. That is, aggregate activity in this economy does not ﬂuc-
tuate through time, making it incapable of addressing questions related to
business cycles. Households are free in this setting to save by accumulating
capital, which in turn is used to produce output, or by borrowing to invest
in (idiosyncratically) risky capital equipment to produce output. Borrowers
operate investment projects that allow this uncertain output to be seen only at
a cost.
An important assumption made in Zha (2001) is that contracts are static, a
featureusedlaterinseveralotherpapers(e.g.,Athreya[2002,2004,forthcom-
ing]; Livshits et al.[2004]; Chatterjee et al.[2002]; and Li and Sarte [2002]).
It is known fromTownsend (1979) that in a setting where a lender faces a cost
ofverifyingthe“state”(income, inthiscase), theoptimalstaticcontractisone
resembling “debt”—that is, a contract where the borrower announces output
(truthfully) and repays a constant amount unless output is relatively low. In
such cases, the household announces (truthfully) that output is low, and the
lender seizes a fraction of the output. The amount of wealth that may be given84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
















































No No Yes No Yes No
No No Yes Yes No No
Yes No/Yes No Yes No Yes
Infinite Infinite Finite Infinite Infinite Infinite
No No No Yes No No
Single Single/
Multiple Single Multiple Single Single
GE PE PE GE PE GE
up to satisfy unsecured creditors is restricted in practice by “exemptions” on
bankruptcy. Zha (2001) ﬁnds that increasing the value of exemptions does
have a positive effect on welfare. Zha (2001) does not, however, compare the
welfare consequences of repealing all default to a setting with default.
Bankruptcyreformeffortsasofthelate1990scenteredaroundtwoaspects
of the law. First, existing bankruptcy law did not require “means-testing”
for would-be ﬁlers. Therefore, potentially high-income ﬁlers would be able
to discharge substantial debt without giving up income. Note carefully the
distinction between income and wealth. Exemptions are rules that explicitly
cover the levels of wealth that debtors may retain in bankruptcy. Means-tests
did not directly apply to these provisions. Athreya (2002) addressed the issue
of means-testing in a simpler environment than that studied by Zha (2001).
The key features of the environment, as in Zha (2001), were a large number of
inﬁnitely lived households facing income risk. Unlike Zha (2001), creditors
were assumed to issue credit cards with ﬁxed “lines” of credit, where the
interest rate on loans did not move with the total debt level. The advantage of
this assumption is that contracts were simple ﬁxed-rate instruments that bore
a closer resemblance to the predominant form of unsecured debt held by U.S.
households. The disadvantage is that credit conditions are restricted to appearK.Athreya: Personal Bankruptcy:A Survey 85
only through prices, whereby bankruptcy law would have no effects on credit
limits.
Athreya (2002) ﬁnds that the means-testing provisions embodied in the
Bankruptcy ReformAct of 1999 would not greatly alter allocations. The intu-
itionisthat,giventhecostsofbankruptcyimpliedbythedata,mosthouseholds
would not ﬁle unless already poor. On the other hand, inAthreya (2002), the
elimination of all bankruptcy was found to be quite beneﬁcial. This is impor-
tant because, as mentioned earlier, the main costs of bankruptcy in Athreya
(2002) come from (1) interest rate “externalities” arising from the pricing of
loans to cover average, as opposed to personalized, repayment rates and from
(2) the assumption that all costs of bankruptcy were deadweight in nature.
In other words, easy bankruptcy law generated a shift of households toward
the use of bankruptcy that necessitated the more frequent use of deadweight
penalties. Onbalance,thefrequencyofﬁlingunderlaxpenaltiesforbankrupt-
cy did not help households smooth consumption in a manner that offset
society’s cost of imposing court costs and possibly “stigma” on ﬁlers.
The estimate in Athreya (2002) is, however, prone to producing a down-
wardly biased estimate of the beneﬁts of eliminating default, at least for the
income process employed.4 This bias arises because with only marginally
more observability, whereby creditors could see total household debt, one
would have expected a large reduction in the cost of credit. Therefore, if the
initial credit limits assumed in Athreya (2002) were lax enough that the ex-
pansion in credit did not exceed the limit initially assumed, then the estimate
may be reasonable. However, if the initially assumed debt level was narrower
than the endogenous debt level that would emerge under partial observability
of debt, then the estimate of the beneﬁts of strict bankruptcy are too low.
Recognizing that the willingness of creditors to lend will be related to
the characteristics that they may observe about a borrower, Chatterjee et
al.(2002), Livshits et al.(2004), and Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2004) each
allow for more observability thanAthreya (2002). Chatterjee et al.(2002) use
an inﬁnite-horizon setting where current period income and current wealth
are both observable, in principle. In addition to allowing for endogenous lim-
its on debt, Chatterjee et al.(2002) also contribute by establishing theoretical
properties associated with recursive representations of household optimiza-
tion problems, speciﬁcally for the case of i.i.d.income shocks. Livshits et
al.(2004), on the other hand, use a life-cycle model and augment the set
of debtor observables to include age. In contrast to both preceding papers,
Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2004) assume a lack of observability beyond pop-
ulation averages. They appeal to an institutional structure whereby banks
ﬁnance lending by issuing securities backed by repayments on the unsecured
4 We revisit this issue when discussing the alternative earning/expense process used by Livshits
et al. (2004).86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
loans they make. The “pools” backing these securities are large and aggregate
a variety of types of households. This route was originally taken in Dubey
et al.(2005) in order to conform to the predominant form of ﬁnancing used
by credit card and mortgage lenders. Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2004) then
go beyond the exogenous limits to borrowing used in Athreya (2002) and
derive borrowing limits consistent with zero proﬁts under this restriction on
observability.
ThepolicyexperimentspursuedinChatterjeeetal.(2002)studythedesir-
ability of (1) means-testing and (2) a reduction in the length of time for which
credit reporting agencies may retain the record of a bankruptcy ﬁling. They
ﬁndthatnearlyallhouseholdswouldprefertorestricttheoptionofbankruptcy
to those households with above-median earnings, and few at all are in support
of a reduction in the legal limit on the length of time that a past bankruptcy
ﬁling may be recorded. Similarly, with respect to whether bankruptcy should
be allowed or not,Athreya (2002) ﬁnds that prohibiting bankruptcy is prefer-
able to permitting it as currently practiced. The intuition for these ﬁndings
is that the increased costs of credit apply to all borrowers (although not with
equalforce)andisanexternalitythatoffsetsthebetterconsumptioninsurance
allowed by bankruptcy in isolation. Athreya (2002) also ﬁnds that means-
testing is not very important, while the availability of bankruptcy is. Notably,
at present there are few restrictions on the current earnings of a household at
the time of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy ﬁling. Nonetheless, the income of ﬁlers is
rarely higher than the median.
Athreya (2002) abstracts from certain types of catastrophic risks, such as
severe health shocks, legal costs of divorce, and the inability to collect man-
dated child support. The shock processes used in the preceding models affect
only income. However, to the extent that such severe shocks are important,
as Sullivan et al.(2000) argue is true for approximately 20 percent of all ﬁl-
ings, income shocks underrepresent the risk faced by households. Livshits et
al.(2004) therefore propose a more extreme feature—that of shocks to “ex-
penses,”ornetworth. Householdsareassumedtobesubjecttooccasional,but
large, reductions in their asset positions. These shocks are meant to capture
large unanticipated expenditures on inelastically demanded types of goods,
such as hospital care or child care. The advantage created by this is to allow
for real risks that appear important in at least a portion of personal bankruptcy
ﬁlings (for example, 19 percent of ﬁlings involved large medical expenses,
according to Sullivan et al.[2000]). However, the presence of expense shocks
that may make current resources deeply negative under the assumption of
standard constant-relative-risk-aversion preferences implies that without the
possibility of default, no one would borrow. This extreme outcome arises
because the full enforcement of debts would mean forcing the household to
zeroconsumption, i.e., literallyforcingittostarveinthefaceoflargenegative
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Thedisadvantagecreatedbythisconditionisthatthecomparisonofoutcomes
with and without a bankruptcy option is not easy to evaluate. On the other
hand, the results of Livshits et al.(2003) are a useful, if stark, benchmark for
how the availability of default facilitates risk-sharing through asset-markets.
Namely, since prohibiting default in their environment would mean not bor-
rowing at all, a portion of the welfare gains from bankruptcy in their model
comes from the complementary role that default plays in enhancing the value
of asset markets.
Multiple-Asset Models
As mentioned earlier, all of the preceding models feature a single asset that
when held in negative quantities, implied borrowing. The absence of any
distinction between assets means that borrowing and negative net worth are
the same thing. This restriction does not match well with the complicated
portfolios households have in the data. For example, Sullivan et al.(2000)
document that while many households in bankruptcy do have substantial un-
secured debt, many also do not have negative net worth. In large part, this
restriction of trade to a single asset was driven by tractability. Some recent
work has relaxed this restriction. The payoffs to accommodating this richness
is that it (1) allows for a closer mapping from model outcomes to observable
data, and(2)allowsustocorrectlymeasuretheabilitytosmoothconsumption
and (3) allows us to analyze policies aimed at allowing households to retain
wealth while discharging debts.
Tractability
With respect to tractability, the chief complication of solving a multiple asset
problem is that of storing all the information the household needs to solve
its optimization problem. Speciﬁcally, dynamic programming techniques are
typically the tools to solve household optimization problems in environments
complicated by uncertainty and “discrete” choices (e.g., to ﬁle or not to ﬁle).
Dynamicprogrammingbecomesradicallymorecumbersomeastheamountof
information required of the household increases. In the context of bankruptcy
exemptions, for example, a household would like to know its feasible options
as it enters a period. However, these options may depend on the precise
composition of household debts and assets. Moreover, even if one is creative
and can deﬁne a single summary statistic that allows households entering
a period to solve their optimization problem, it may be at the expense of
complicating the “within-period” problem of the household. For example,
in Athreya (forthcoming), households may hold secured and unsecured debt.
Nonetheless, “total wealth” serves as the single variable that households must
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AnalyzingExemptions:ThePayofftoAllowingMultipleAssets
Despite the computational burdens involved, multiple-asset models are valu-
able, as they allow for the study of households that may be saving and
borrowingsimultaneously. Inturn,suchmodelsallowresearcherstomeaning-
fully study important policy questions pertaining to bankruptcy, most notably,
the rules deﬁning exemptions. The latter govern the extent to which wealth
may be held while debts are discharged. Exemptions have attracted a great
deal of attention recently, both academically and in the public discussion on
bankruptcy. Exemptions are, most generally, allowances for certain types
of wealth that bankruptcy ﬁlers may retain after bankruptcy. Any wealth in
excess of exemptions must be surrendered to satisfy unsecured lenders.
Theideathatsubstantialwealthmaybeprotectedfromseizurebycreditors
has long been controversial (see, e.g., Moss [forthcoming]). In support of
exemptions is the following intuition: Because they partially govern how
much “state-contingency” is truly embedded in an unsecured loan, it may
be useful for a household to be able to hold at least one asset with payoffs
that it can manipulate to serve its needs. For example, even if a loan is not
explicitlycollateralized,itmaybeimplicitlyso,simplybecauseahouseholdin
bankruptcy would be required to transfer any nonexempt wealth to unsecured
creditors. Thus, an unsecured loan may be effectively collateralized, even if
wealth is not explicitly pledged by the debtor. By contrast, a large exemption
will allow most unsecured borrowing to be cleanly discharged in bankruptcy
if the household ﬁnds itself in difﬁcult circumstances. Proponents also argue
that, after bankruptcy, it is important to allow a household to run its affairs
without becoming destitute and, potentially, a recipient of publicly funded
transfers (see, e.g., Baird [2001]). Opponents, on the other hand, argue that
those who are wealthy along some dimensions (though not along net-worth
perhaps) should not be excused from debt obligations. A ﬁnal concern with
more ambiguous welfare implications is that to the extent that they are aware
of a household’s assets when making unsecured loans, creditors will price
this risk. If observability is low, all unsecured borrowers will face higher
borrowing costs, and if not, wealthy households alone will be able to obtain
unsecured credit. We will return to the role of observability later in the article.
In a model that allows for simultaneous holdings of both debt and equity,
Athreya (forthcoming) ﬁnds that, conditional on allowing bankruptcy, high
exemptions are actually useful, even if they make unsecured debt more ex-
pensive. A ramiﬁcation of high exemptions is that the cost of unsecured debt
will be higher under high exemptions. This is precisely what data analyzed in
Gropp et al.(1997) suggest. Their work is an important study on exemptions
thatutilizesthenaturalexperimentprovidedbyinterstatevariationswithinthe
United States. They document strong evidence supporting the view that ex-
emptionsmakeunsecuredcreditmoreexpensive. Morerecently,Grant(2003)
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fortherisk-sharingroleofexemptions. Hisestimatesindicatethatexemptions
noticeablyreducegrowthinthecross-sectionalvariationofincome. Thelatter
can be interpreted as an improvement in “market completeness,” or insurance
possibilities (see Deaton and Paxson [1994] for details).
Becausebankruptcyexemptionsvaryacrossstates, ElulandSubramanian
(2002) document the extent to which households move across state lines to
avail of more generous bankruptcy exemptions. Given that bankruptcy ﬁlers
typically have low incomes at the time of ﬁling, interstate moves may be a
useful option for a household, given the fall in the market value of its time.
The authors ﬁnd that “forum shopping” (the explicit decision to search for a
friendly set of laws) accounts for roughly 1 percent of all interstate moves to
a state with a higher exemption.
Two additional recent studies deserve discussion. First, Li and Sarte
(forthcoming) employ a setting in which two simpliﬁcations used in all prior
work are relaxed. Their ﬁrst innovation is to model the choice of bankruptcy
“chapter,” and the second is to accommodate production decisions. With re-
spect to the former, in the discussion so far, I have implicitly combined all
forms of personal bankruptcy. However, there are typically two forms of
bankruptcy available to a household debtor. These are Chapters 7 and 13 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The former is most familiar, and simply removes
all unsecured debt in exchange for the surrender of all wealth above the ex-
emption. Chapter 13, by contrast, is (at least in principle) less extreme. In
particular, Chapter 13 is a form of debt rescheduling whereby a debtor agrees
to repay a portion of his unsecured debts over time. This form of bankruptcy
is particularly useful for households that hold wealth substantially in excess
of the exemption allowed to them. However, the repayment plan poses two
challenges. First, repayment over time may act like a tax on effort, and lead
households to change effort. To capture the consequences of such reductions
in effort, it is useful to study settings which allow for production of output.
Second, current law allows households to convert a Chapter 13 ﬁling into a
Chapter 7 at any time. The latter clearly limits the extent to which repay-
ment can be extracted from debtors. Li and Sarte (forthcoming) ﬁnd notably
that allowing production and capital accumulation overturns the stark results
of Athreya (2002) in that eliminating bankruptcy lowers welfare. To elabo-
rate,easybankruptcylowersprecautionarysavingsandtherebylowersoutput,
while eliminating Chapter 7 bankruptcy altogether hinders risk sharing to an
inefﬁcient degree, as Chapter 13 does not provide the same allowance for
contingent repayment.
As Li and Sarte (forthcoming) allow for production, the accumulation
of capital augments production and also allows for an additional asset with
which households may smooth consumption. At the household level, wealth
is still described by ﬁnancial claims, as the capital in their model is use-
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a ﬂow of services. However, a key aspect of many exemptions applicable
to bankruptcy is that they often apply only to special classes of nonﬁnancial
assets, which typically provide a ﬂow of services to households. The largest
and most famous exemptions are those applying to home equity (the Home-
stead Exemption), to equity in cars, and to “tools of trade.” Pavan (2003)
movesresearchforwardbyexplicitlymodelingtheservicesthatdurablegoods
provide their owners. This allows for more precise welfare analysis. Un-
like Athreya (2002, 2004), Pavan uses a life cycle model, and estimates its
parameters. Pavan’s work is noteworthy for its emphasis on the use of formal
statistical inference in guiding the selection of parameters. By contrast, while
Athreya(2002, 2004, forthcoming), LiandSarte(forthcoming), andothersdo
assign values to parameters, the procedures used are less informed by formal
statistical practice, and rely more on the informal matching of key features
of the data. Unlike Li and Sarte (forthcoming) andAthreya (2002), however,
Pavan uses a partial equilibrium model whereby the costs of funds are held
ﬁxed. Given that Li and Sarte (forthcoming) ﬁnd that ignoring general equi-
librium is not innocuous for studying exemptions, this distinction is worth
keeping in mind.
The Role of Observability
The “insurance” value of bankruptcy depends critically on the extent to which
debtpricesdonot varywithdefaultrisk. Toseewhy,consideraworldinwhich
competingcreditorswereabletoviewacommonsetoffactorsassociatedwith
a debtor’s default probability. Competition requires that cross-subsidization
of some borrowers by other borrowers must not occur along any dimension
that is commonly observed by creditors. This is simply because if any two
borrowers have observably different characteristics, the relatively less risky
borrower would be offered a cheaper rate.
As discussed earlier, assumptions on observability matter for predicting
the response of lenders in the face of changes in bankruptcy policy. There-
fore, these assumptions must also matter from a welfare perspective. The
intuition is as follows. An insurance contract works by allowing the buyer
to diversify risk and thereby transfer purchasing power from contingencies
where additional consumption is valued less, to those contingencies in which
it is valued more. Accurate risk-based pricing and competition will make the
default option more expensive, as pricing will more closely reﬂect marginal
default risk as opposed to the average risk that would be accounted for in the
absence of such observability. However, the beneﬁt of strong observability is
that explicit insurance contracts can play an important role, voiding the need
for households to rely on the relatively clumsy implicit insurance of credit
with a default option.
The work of Edelberg (2003) is the ﬁrst to document the changes in the
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data primarily from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which contains
detailed information on household balance sheets, especially the level and
terms of borrowing. She ﬁnds that the period beginning in the mid-1990s wit-
nessedasharpincreaseinthecross-sectionalvarianceofinterestratescharged
to consumers. This work casts some doubt on the results arising in models
suchasAthreya(2002),whereasingleinterestrateonunsecuredcreditapplied
to all households. According to Moss and Johnson (1999), the latter approach
mayhavebeenareasonableassumptionforthe1980sandearly1990s, butad-
vances in recordkeeping and other intermediation technologies have dropped
the costs of differentiation of borrowers. The issue of intermediation costs
willplayanimportantrole, aswewillseeinthenextsection. Beforeproceed-
ing, however, it is useful to summarize the following provisional conclusions
reached by the works cited above:
• Underincomeprocessesthatallowforlargeshockstonetworth, bank-
ruptcy can play a role in improving welfare, but not without them.
• As a quantitative matter, moral hazard needs to be taken seriously in
evaluating bankruptcy provisions.
• Exemptions tend to distribute credit away from the asset-poor to the
asset-rich, but can improve welfare.
• Observability is an important determinant of how the supply side of
credit markets and household welfare respond to bankruptcy policy.
A Quantitative EquilibriumApproach for Explaining
Recent Trends
Despite the now relatively large quantitative equilibrium literature on bank-
ruptcy, the project of accounting for the time-series of the 1990s has thus
far been almost exclusively tackled via purely empirical approaches. A main
reason is that only recently has quantitative theorizing on bankruptcy be-
come tractable, but even within these models, long-run “stationary” states
have proved far easier to characterize than ongoing aggregate dynamics such
as those observed in the 1990s. In particular, the technical problems facing
quantitative equilibrium approaches in dealing with the 1990s are twofold.
First, when aggregates move over time, so will prices such as the interest
rate on savings or loans. Unfortunately, incompleteness of insurance is a pre-
condition for evaluating the trade-offs associated with default. These models,
in turn, contain households whose fortunes diverge with time, and as a conse-
quence, feature wealth holdings that diverge through time. Precisely because
households become heterogenous in their wealth holdings, their response to
individual level or aggregate uncertainty also becomes heterogenous. In turn,
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by the entire distribution of wealth and make problems very hard to analyze
numerically. Nonetheless,Athreya(2004),describedbelow,makesaﬁrst,and
admittedly simple, attempt to account for the 1990s.
The Roles of Stigma and Technology
Detecting stigma matters for the welfare analysis of bankruptcy statutes. Let
stigmabedeﬁnedtomeanallcostsofsocialdisapprovalassociatedwithﬁling
for bankruptcy. Stigma matters because it is a penalty suffered by ﬁlers after
a ﬁling has taken place, and most importantly, one that hurts the ﬁler, but
does not directly help anyone else. If bankruptcy is an activity that society
seeks to limit, then society must be aware of the possibility that if a penalty
is too weak at the individual level to deter bankruptcy, imposing it very often
may make it undesirable. Conversely, severe censure of ﬁlers by society may
be bad for at least two reasons. First, if the incidence of bankruptcy does
not fall substantially, society will ﬁnd itself imposing a large “after-the-fact”
punishment far too frequently. Second, if bankruptcy has a potential role in
risk sharing, severe social sanctions may stunt consumption smoothing. The
optimal social stigma strikes a balance between these two concerns. The
preceding argument is also normative in the sense that it may tell us how
strictly we wish to deal with bankruptcy ﬁlers along dimensions that merely
punish them without helping others.5
With respect to the time path of stigma, the stunning rise in per-capita
ﬁling rates in bankruptcy, from 0.3 percent in 1980 to 1.6 percent at present,
has captured the attention of many researchers. Gross and Souleles (2002)
is perhaps the best known of these studies. The essence of their exercise is
to ask if debtors who look similar along a multitude of ﬁnancial dimensions
have differentially large likelihoods of ﬁling for bankruptcy recently relative
to the past. They ﬁnd the answer to be “yes,” and conclude that falling stigma
is a plausible story for recent data. Similarly, Fay, Hurst, and White (2002)
argue that, even after controlling for state-level ﬁxed effects, a rise in the
bankruptcy rate in a given state predicts a further increase in the following
year. Interpretation of empirical regularity is tricky, however. In particular,
to the extent that households learn the bankruptcy process from each other
and decide that it is easier than they believed, currently high ﬁling rates may
lead to even higher ﬁling rates. From the viewpoint of predicting bankruptcy
rates, whether one interprets the data as evidence of either falling stigma or
learning matters little.6 However, it may matter much more from a welfare
perspective, for the reasons discussed above.
5 The obvious analogy here is to crime and punishment, with its focus on rehabilitation against
deterrence.
6 Indeed, Gross and Souleles (2002) do not restrict their interpretations to falling stigma, but
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Athreya (2004) addresses the issue of stigma via an alternative route, by
studying a quantitative, dynamic equilibrium model of borrowing. The article
conducts two experiments. In the ﬁrst case, stigma is initially “calibrated,”
i.e., set to a level that allows the model to match debt and bankruptcy ﬁling
rate data as of 1991. The value of this stigma is then lowered to zero. In the
second experiment, stigma is ﬁxed at the level consistent with data for 1991.
The transactions costs associated with unsecured consumer lending is then
sharply lowered. The latter assumption is motivated chieﬂy by the work of
Edelberg (2003) discussed above.
TheexercisesinAthreya(2004)suggestthattheeliminationofstigmawill
produceincreasesinbankruptcyontheorderobservedinthedatabutwillalso
result in sharply lower debt loads carried by households, a situation distinctly
at odds with the data. However, the experiment of lowering transactions costs
is able to match not only the observed increase in ﬁling rates, but also the
increasesindebt/incomeratiosobservedinU.S.data. Thekeyintuitiondriving




unsecured lending cannot occur, as households will happily take any loan
offered to them and then promptly default. By contrast, to the extent that
Edelberg (2003) is accurate, credit “supply” (i.e., the willingness to lend for
a given interest rate) should have expanded for purely technological reasons,
allowing for the simultaneous increase in debt and ﬁling rates observed in the
data.
Even with lowered stigma, the expansionary pressure on credit supply
arising from cheaper intermediation is present, though to a more limited
degree. That is, stigma may indeed have fallen, only to be overwhelmed





As documented by Fisher (2003), and Shepard (1984), a large portion of ﬁlers
report receiving publicly funded transfers in the year in which they ﬁled for
bankruptcy. Maybe most tellingly, Sullivan et al.(2000) ﬁnd that more than
two-thirds of all bankruptcy ﬁlers report experiencing an income disruption
near the time of ﬁling.
The empirical work of Sullivan et al.(2002) argues that not only are many
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proportionate share of those receiving unemployment insurance also ﬁle for
bankruptcy. Speciﬁcally,Sullivanetal.(2002)ﬁndthattheunemploymentrate
among bankruptcy ﬁlers is between three to four times the national average.7
Thebankruptcyrateamongtheunemployedisalsomuchhigheratroughly3.5
percent, or four times higher than the overall population rate (approximately
1 percent annually in recent years). Data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics show that 12 percent of bankruptcy ﬁlers in 1995 lost their jobs
between 1994–1995, as opposed to just 2.15 percent of non-ﬁlers. Bermant
andFlynn(2002)arguethatbankruptcyﬁlersalsohaveshorterjobtenurethan
non-ﬁlerswherebyjobtenureatthemedianforthebankruptpopulationisonly
two years, less than half of the 4.7 years of tenure for the non-bankrupt popu-
lation. Sullivan et al.(2000) ﬁnd that more than two-thirds of all households
that ﬁle for bankruptcy report job-related income disruptions.
The quantitative evaluation of the effects of this form of insurance on
behavior relating to other forms is new. The work of Livshits et al.(2003)
compares bankruptcy in the United States and Germany, taking as given the
structureofpublicinsurancepoliciesineachcountry. Themainﬁndingisthat
“fresh-start”bankruptcyisfarlessdesirableinthepresenceofthecomprehen-
sive public insurance present in Germany. Athreya and Simpson (forthcom-
ing) study an environment in which the public insurance system, including
programs like the U.S. unemployment insurance system and welfare, coexist
withthemoreimplicitinsurancethatunsecureddebtwithbankruptcymaypro-
vide. Unlike prior work, Athreya and Simpson (forthcoming) not only allow
more generous insurance to affect credit markets, but also to allow credit mar-
kets to affect behavior in public insurance programs. They ﬁnd that the U.S.
bankruptcy code obstructs public insurance provision in the United States.
More surprisingly, they ﬁnd that a more comprehensive social safety net pro-
vided,forexample,throughpubliclyfundedinsurance,willactuallyencourage
risk-taking and reduce job search among the unemployed to such an extent
thatbankruptcyﬁlingsrise. Moregenerally,theprecedingmakesthefollowing
clear:
Bankruptcy should be analyzed jointly with available insurance programs,
because these systems can interact in perverse ways.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKSAND FUTURE WORK
Recent work has produced substantial progress in revealing the conditions
prevailing at, before, and after bankruptcy. Such work has also revealed that
interstate variation in rules, particularly exemptions, matter for household
7 Bermant, Flynn, and Bakewell (2002) estimate a rate of 19 percent in 2002 from self-
reported unemployment data. Athreya and Simpson (2004) ﬁnd a rate of 16 percent from PSID
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decisions and for the availability and distribution of unsecured credit. The
ﬁndings established by careful empirical work has proved critical for quanti-
tative equilibrium work that aims to account for the observations. The latter
has reached some provisional conclusions.
• Underincomeprocessesthatallowforlargeshockstonetworth, bank-
ruptcy can play a role in improving welfare. Without large shocks,
however, bankruptcy is difﬁcult to justify.
• As a quantitative matter, moral hazard needs to be taken seriously in
evaluating bankruptcy provisions.
• Exemptions tend to distribute credit away from the asset-poor to the
asset-rich but do not appear to lower welfare.
• Falling stigma is not a convincing explanation for the recent rise in
bankruptcy rates.
• Bankruptcy should be analyzed jointly with available insurance pro-
grams, because these systems can interact in perverse ways.
Despite the progress evident from the work done so far, many interesting
questions remain, the resolution of which is critical for forming a deﬁnitive
view of the role for personal default. From a theoretical perspective, perhaps
the most useful work will be to endogenize fully the exclusion that seems to
affect those who have ﬁled for bankruptcy. Speciﬁcally, in a competitive set-
ting, exclusioncanonlytakeplaceif, afterabankruptcyﬁling, itisoptimizing
torestrictlendingtosuchaborrower. Severalmutuallynonexclusivepossibili-
tiesarise. First, andperhapsmostnaturally, bankruptcymayrevealsomething
more “permanent” about a ﬁler. The most obvious is that a bankruptcy was
triggered by a persistent shock to household earnings-generating capacity. In
such an event, a household may have a very low ability or willingness to ser-
vice debt. However, the desire of a household to smooth intertemporally may
also be very limited. In this case, observing that a household does not borrow
followingbankruptcydoesnotpindownwhyitdoesnotborrow. Theproblem
of rationalizing exclusion may in part stem from the inability of credit market
dataandincomedatatoprovidehighqualitytargetsthatanequilibriummodel
must match. Recent progress on this dimension is the work of Yue (2004),
who allows for a limited form of “renegotiation” in debts between creditors
and borrowers.
A second open issue is the role of stigma and an assessment of its im-
portance in determining outcomes. While it seems unconvincing to argue
that stigma has fallen, it seems quite plausible that some stigma or societal
disapproval exists for bankruptcy. However, there is not a single, universally
accepted measure of this. Nonetheless, knowing the extent to which shame96 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
andstigmamatterisnecessaryformakingaccuratestatementsaboutthequan-
titative usefulness of bankruptcy to improve welfare.
A third issue is the role of bankruptcy in exacerbating moral hazard in
insurance programs such as public unemployment assistance, as well as the
role of the latter in encouraging bankruptcy. More work along the lines of
Athreya and Simpson (forthcoming) will be useful in determining the extent
to which bankruptcy and other insurance schemes (both private and public),
confound each other.
A fourth issue based on the arguments above, bodes the question, why is
default, regardless of whether it is legally mandated or privately contracted,
useful? In the United States, however, the Constitution preserves the right of
the federal government to promulgate uniform nationwide bankruptcy law. It
is primarily the legal provision for bankruptcy that raises the issue of whether
it improves welfare or not.
A ﬁnal issue is to reconcile the two possible rationales for market in-
completeness. Namely, is insurance incomplete precisely because of limited
commitment arising from bankruptcy, or because of standard complications
arising from asymmetric information? Future work that is able to deal effec-
tively with these issues will greatly advance our understanding on the desir-
ability of personal bankruptcy.
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